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THE VALIDITY OF ZONING AN ENTIRE
MUNICIPALITY EXCLUSIVELY RESIDENTIAL
The creation within a municipality of restricted residential dis-
tricts from which business and trade can be excluded has been con-
sidered valid since the 1926 Supreme Court decision of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.1 Although the people of a municipality
have a right to endeavor to maintain the character of their city, this
right has its constitutional limits. 2 The problem, then, is to consider
the proper function of land use planning and control and to define
the limits of municipal protectionism that can be exercised through
the local zoning power.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Cadoux v. Planning &
Zoning Commissions held that it is not unreasonable to establish a
single zoning district, encompassing the entire 20 square mile Weston,
Connecticut, municipality, limiting the district to minimum two-
acre family residence, farming, and associated incidental uses. The
general orientation of the residents for employment, shopping, and
other services was toward the town of Westport, Connecticut, and
New York City. The function of Weston itself was that of "a resi-
dential area for single-family homes in a rural Connecticut setting.' 4
Plaintiff in Cadoux applied for an amendment to the zoning regula-
tions to establish a shopping center district to include both plaintiff's
4.18 acre parcel and the adjacent, already existing shopping center,
then being maintained as a nonconforming use. The court, in affirm-
ing the denial of the application for amendment, stated that "[i]t is,
in each case, a question of fact as to reasonableness, which depends
upon the needs of the community and the adaptability of property
therein for residential uses."0
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325
(1927).
2. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Reynolds v. Barret, 12 Cal. 2d
244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938); Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81
N.W.2d 789 (1957).
3. 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972).
4. Id. at 428, 294 A.2d at 583.
5. Id., citing 1 A. RATHxOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 14-8 (3d ed.
1966).
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Governmental power to interfere with the general rights of land-
owners by restricting the character of their land use through zoning
is not unlimited. The established rule, which is generally recognized
by state courts,6 is that the restrictions of a zoning ordinance must
be substantially related to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare.7 To justify the state imposing its authority on behalf of the
public through its exercise of police power, it must appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from a particular
class, require such interference and that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose" Where there is
room for fair difference of opinion or if the reasonableness of the
ordinance is fairly debatable, the courts will not disturb the legisla-
tive decision.9 If the ordinance is held to be a proper exercise of the
police power, the right of the property owner to the unrestricted use
of his property is subordinated to the exercise of such power.
A plaintiff may attack a zoning ordinance in two ways: he may
argue that the ordinance is invalid in its specific application to his
land or that it is invalid in its general application to the community.
In the case of the former, if enforcement of the terms of the ordinance
would result in arbitrary and unreasonable injury to an owner of
specific property, the ordinance will be void as to such property
even though the general scheme of the ordinance is valid.10 In
Cadoux, however, plaintiff could not claim that the ordinance was
unreasonable in its application to his property because his property
was neither unsuited for residential use nor did the residential zon-
ing destroy the value of the property.1
6. See Annot., 117 A.L.R. 1117, 1124 (1938).
7. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). See also Annot., 117
A.L.R. 1117, 1124 (1938).
8. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). See also Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); People v. Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 279 P.
136 (1929).
9. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Zahn v. Board of
Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
10. See, e.g., Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, I Cal. 2d 87, 33
P.2d 672 (1934).
11. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kirby v. City of Rockford, 363 Ill. 531, 2 N.E.2d
842 (1936); Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 689,
108 S.W.2d 143 (1937); Chusud Realty Co. v. Village of Kensington, 40 Misc.
2d 259, 243 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Rockdale Constr. Corp. v. Village
of Cedarhurst, 94 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 275 App. Div. 1043, 91
N.Y.S.2d 926 (1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E.2d 76 (1950).
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Thus, plaintiff argued that the ordinance was generally invalid-
that since the ordinance provided for only one zoning district for
the entire municipality, to the exclusion of all business, industry,
and even apartments, the restrictions were illegal and arbitrary. In
actuality, there is scant authority upholding the validity of zoning a
municipality exclusively residential,12 although it has been held that
a municipality on the periphery of a large metropolitan center may
constitutionally pass a one-use ordinance in order to retain its resi-
dential character.13 Limitations on such ordinances have been con-
structed, however, so that a municipality has the power to incorporate
into a single-use district only so long as the business and industrial
needs of its inhabitants are supplied by other accessible areas in the
community at large,' 4 the zoning at that particular place is reason-
12. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955),
principally relied upon in Cadoux, noted that Valley View, on the periphery of
a large metropolitan center, was not a self-contained community, but only an
"adventitious fragment of the economic and social whole." Id. at 418. The court
could not conclude as a matter of law that an ordinance which places all of such
a village into a residential district is per se arbitrary and unresonable, at
least not without regard to the public need for business or industrial uses. Connor
v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957), upheld a
similar ordinance upon the presumption that: "[I]f the regulation is not clearly
unreasonable and arbitrary, and if it operates uniformly on all persons similarly
situated in the particular district which was not itself selected arbitrarily, it will
be upheld." Id. at 210, 81 N.W.2d at 791.
Several cases are cited in support of the results in Cadoux, Valley View
Village, and Connor, but have slightly different facts. Gautier v. Town of Jupiter
Island, 142 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1962), upheld the validity of an ordinance enacted
to preserve the unique status of the town, which had existed for many years
geographically isolated, restricting land use therein to single-family dwellings.
Village of Old Westbury v. Foster, 193 Misc. 47, 83 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct.
1948), upheld an injunction to restrain the operation of a business in the residence
zone of a village endeavoring to maintain a somewhat rural atmosphere in its
development and to keep it practically free from business. In both of these cases,
however, a small portion of each municipality was zoned for business.
Gardner v. Leboeuf, 24 Misc. 2d 511, 204 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1960),
aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 226 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1962); Nehrbas v. Village of
Lloyd Harbor, 147 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d
1034, 152 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159
N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957), and State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), concerned communities zoned entirely
residential but were not directed so as to specifically uphold the validity of such
zoning.
13. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
14. Id. at 418.
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able,1" and, as a matter of statutory construction, the municipality's
zoning enabling act permits the zoning of the municipality into one
district.16
Municipalities have traditionally been required to zone with re-
gard to municipal needs. 17 Although the courts have rarely considered
nonmunicipal uses of land not contiguous to the zoning municipal-
ity, when courts have done so, it has generally been to justify the
municipality's exclusion of some type of land use from its borders.""
Departing from the rather narrow view of a self-contained municipal-
15. Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
See also Annot., 86 A.L.R. 642 (1931). Dowsey held that a village ordinance
which, with the exception of a small plot, placed the entire village in a one-
family residence district, was unreasonable as to property on the boundary of
the village and fronting on a much used road. The zoning ordinance was in-
tended to prevent the intrusion of business and apartment buildings and to pre-
serve the rural quiet, but the court held that the village could not restrict prop-
erty to a use for which it was not adapted.
Rockdale Constr. Corp. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 94 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct.),
afl'd, 275 App. Div. 1043, 91 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1949), aft'd, 301 N.Y. 519, 93
N.E.2d 76 (1950), held that the zoning ordinance limiting the use of plaintiff's
comer lots fronting on a four-lane turnpike to residential purposes was void as
to plaintiff's property, particularly on the facts that land across the road was
unrestricted and commercially developed.
16. City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963), held
that under its zoning enabling act, the municipality lacked the power and auth-
ority to adopt a zoning ordinance which restricted the use of land and buildings
therein to a single purpose, in this case one-family dwellings. The court noted
that the enabling act requires all zoning to be made in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan and rejected the city's argument that a plan may be comprehen-
sive even though it establishes only a one-use district. The soundness of the Moline
Acres decision was, however, questioned in McDermott v. Village of Calverton
Park, 454 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo. 1970), where the court found nothing to in-
dicate a legislative intent that "under all circumstances, a municipality must
provide for more than one use in its ordinance." See also Gunderson v. Village
of Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 352, 126 N.W.2d 715 (1964), which held that the
applicable zoning enabling act did not authorize one-use zoning of the entire
illage.
Town of Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958), held that
although the ordinance was not unconstitutional per se and void, the boundaries
of the town were not proper boundaries of a residence district because all of the
land was not suited for residential purposes.
17. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th
Cir. 1955); O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949);
City of Waxahachie v. Walldns, 154 Tex. 206, 275 S.W.2d 477 (1955). See also
Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107, 115.
18. Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 922 n.113
(1970).
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ity, Cadoux joins the short line of authority that indicates that both
commercial and industrial development may be excluded from a
municipality if sufficient facilities are located in an adjacent com-
munity.19 It has been noted that in one case which adopted such a
view,2 0 the court saw the need for regionalism in order to validate
the statute, yet ignored the needs of the larger area: "[T]he only
aspect of regionalism considered by the court was the isolationist
view of the township."21 The extra-municipal area should be con-
sidered since "[t]he effective development of a region should not and
cannot be made to depend upon the adventitious location of munic-
ipal boundaries." 22 A zoning ordinance will, following this line of
cases, be upheld if extra-municipal development satisfies local needs.
Particularly in such instances, however, a municipality must be pre-
vented from putting up exclusionary walls in accordance with "local
whim or selfish desire."2 3
Cases which expressly require that the municipality consider the
extraterritorial effect of its zoning restrictions are rare. Indeed, the
very propriety of such a consideration may be questioned. 24 Typically,
municipalities have merely to zone "in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan"'25 which in nearly every instance means only that zon-
ing must be internally consistent and not patently arbitrary.20 Thus,
in Cadoux, the zoning ordinance is internally consistent with the
19. See Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955);
Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963); Fanale
v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958); Duffcon
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
20. Haar, Zoning for Municipal Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
HARv. L. Rzv. 1051 (1953), noting Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne,
10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952).
21. Haar, supra note 20, at 1053.
22. Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513,
64 A.2d 347, 350 (1949).
23. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962)
(dissenting opinion).
24. Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning Con-
text, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732, 736 (1970), citing R. ANDERSON, PROVINCIALISM AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, FEDERATION PLANNING INFORMATION REPORT 4-5 (N.J. Fcd'n.
of Planning Officials, Jan. 1970).
25. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Troy, 241 Ala. 637, 4 So. 2d 1 (1941);
Magnin v. Zoning Comm'n, 145 Conn. 26, 138 A.2d 522 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 29 So. 2d 342 (1947);
Chase v. City of Glen Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 889, 246 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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town's comprehensive plan and is upheld because the regional re-
sources and facilities satisfy the town's needs. What is not considered
in Cadoux, and is rarely considered by the courts, is the effect of the
town's restrictions on the rest of the region and the burden the town
places on regional resources and facilities.
The municipality's affirmative duty to satisfy regional needs is
extremely limited.27 In cases in which the courts are asked to find a
zoning ordinance invalid because of a regional need, the courts tend
to find that the need is insufficient to justify overturning the ordi-
nance. For instance, one court denied a municipal obligation to leave
land available for the satisfaction of a county need, at least in the
absence of a showing that the county was so developed that the
borough was the "last hope" for solution of its problem.28 Another
court held that the regional need for a shopping center at the approx-
imate location of the land in question was insufficient to overcome
local factors such as traffic conditions, water drainage, and the high
value of surrounding residential land.2 9
Although the courts have not yet gone so far as to impose the
affirmative duty on the municipality to satisfy regional needs, the
trend is that the effect of the municipality's restrictions on the rest of
the region should be a factor taken into consideration when the valid-
ity of zoning is questioned.30 Zoning ordinances, although operating
locally, constitute an exercise of the police power of the state.31 Dele-
gation of power by the state to enact ordinances not inconsistent
with existing law, which shall be deemed expedient or desirable for
the health of residents, is not a delegation of the entire police power
of the state, but is limited to matters of an inherently local nature.32
Traditionally, the "public" for whose health, safety, morals or wel-
fare a municipality must zone has been conceived to include only the
27. See Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, supra note 17, at 120.
28. Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749(1958).
29. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963).
30. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J.
Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough
of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
31. E.g., Dahman v. City of Ballwin, 483 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1972).
32. E.g., Robin v. Village Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d 285,
334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972).
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residents of the municipality itself, 33 even though this might not in-
clude the whole "public" that the zoning affects. Suburbs, and the
rural municipalities over which they are sprawling, regulate the use
and development of most of the vacant land in metropolitan areas,
yet this regulation has a pervasive effect upon the lives of people
outside the borders of the suburbs.34 These extra-territorial effects of
zoning ordinances tend to show that a municipality has exceeded the
power granted to it under a zoning enabling act limiting the munici-
pality to matters of a local nature only.
Thus, while the Cadoux court did consider whether the needs (em-
ployment, business, industry, shopping and services) of the citizens
of Weston were adequately met by the resources and facilities of the
surrounding community, it did not consider the burden that the
surrounding community would have to bear because of Weston's
restrictions. The court did not go so far as to balance the good of the
public of Weston against the over-all "community" good. For while
Weston considered itself part of the "community" for the purpose
of taking advantage of all of the services that the community could
provide, it did not consider itself part of the "community" to the
extent that it would accept responsibility for any of the costs, burdens
and needs that the surrounding community might find necessary to
impose upon it. Although courts will not generally impose the affirm-
ative duty to satisfy regional needs upon a municipality, they should
at least consider the potentially adverse impact restrictive municipal
zoning could have upon the entire region. The use of zoning to avoid
the increased economic burdens which growth brings, or to preserve
rural, exclusive and aesthetic character is not a proper purpose when
the larger community needs to be otherwise developed. The courts
should look beyond the reasonableness of the zoning ordinance for
a particular community and the fulfillment of that particular com-
munity's needs, and should balance the reasonableness of that ordi-
nance with the needs and capacities of the entire area that the ordi-
nance will affect.
Terry L. Kaye
33. Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, supra note 17, at 118. See
In re Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 91 P. 429 (Dist. Ct. App. 1907); Cook County
v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512 (1924); City of Chicago v.
Pennsylvania Co., 252 I1. 185, 96 N.E. 833 (1911); House v. City of Greens-
burg, 93 Ind. 533 (1883) (plaintiff held not to have standing to contest the
vacating of the street upon which his property abutted because his property was
outside of the Greensburg city limits).
34. See The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, supra note 18, at 921-24.
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